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[hereinafter "B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT] submits the following as 
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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiff-Appellant is B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C, 
a Utah limited liability company. [The name "B.A.M." is 
derived from the initial letter of the three children of 
B.A.M.'s principal and sole member, Mr Scott M McCleary.] 
The Defendant-Appellee SALT LAKE COUNTY is a body 
politic and political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
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B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., 
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body politic and political 
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Defendant-Appellee 
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Docket No. 20070137CA 
[Argument priority 15] 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is granted 
pursuant to order of the Utah Supreme Court to "pour over" 
this case to the Court of Appeals, in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 78-2a-2 (3) (j) , Utah Code . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal (and the predicate factual situation 
surrounding it) presents the following issues for review: 
1. The District Court erred in failing to 
properly apply and follow the Nollan-Dolan "rough 
proportionality" standard against the Plaintiff's 
"inverse condemnation" claims for $400,000+ as 
"just compensation" payment for constitutionally-
excessive roadway improvements and dedications, 
pursuant to the remand of the Utah Supreme Court 
in its appellate decision in this case, 2006 UT 2, 
128 P.3d 1161 (Utah 2006). The District Court's 
failure to properly consider and apply the Dolan 
"rough proportionality" (the government must make 
a pre-taking "individualized determination that 
the required dedication is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development") standard includes, but is not 
necessarily limited to: 
a. Incorrectly concluding that the 
3.04% of the increased traffic count is 
"roughly proportional" (i.e. "related in 
scope and nature") to the required 
payment of 10 0.0 0% of the improvement 
costs of the 3500 South Street roadway, 
the major portion of which is utilized by 
the public-at-large which derives a 
96.96% benefit perhaps more from 
those improvements, which are of no 
direct benefit to the residents of the 
new development, who benefit therefrom 
only as members of the public-at-large, 
which should, per the constitutional 
mandates, pay just compensation for such 
improvements. 
b. Incorrectly concluding that the 
3.04% "impact" (as measured by increased 
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traffic count of vehicles upon the 
roadway) mathematically correlates (i.e. 
is "roughly proportional") to a required 
right-of-way dedication which constitutes 
2.2% of the total real estate the 
Developer proposed for development. 
c. Rejecting the Developer's claims for 
the out-of-pocket expenses (in excess of 
$200,000) mandatorily incurred for the 
roadway improvements to 3500 South Street 
in addition to the required real estate 
"dedication". 
d. Rejecting the Developer's "state 
law" claims [i.e. lack of "reasonable 
relationship" and violation of the 
Banberry "constitutional standard of 
reasonableness"] which are the stated 
equivalent to the "rough proportionality" 
standard of Dolan. 
2. The District Court erred in evaluating the 
evidence and the Dolan "burden of proof" [to the 
effect that the governmental entity SALT LAKE 
COUNTY has the affirmative duty of making a pre-
exaction "individualized determination" that the 
exactions required (i.e. 3500 South Street roadway 
improvements) are "roughly proportional" , in scope 
and nature, to the impact created by the B.A.M. 
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project [i.e. approximately 440 vehicles per day, 
constituting less than 3.04% of the additional 
traffic generated upon the pre-existing roadway, 
but for which B.A.M. was required to install 
improvements which for that "frontage" segment 
of the roadway essentially tripled (from 12,000 
vehicles per day to a COUNTY-acknowledged 37,000 
vehicles per day) the vehicle carrying-capacity of 
the roadway segment] and for which B.A.M. was 
required to pay 100% of the cost. A mere 3.04% of 
the "impact" (as described in "vehicle trips per 
day") is not, as a matter of law, "roughly 
proportional" to the required payment of 100% of 
the cost of the improvements. 
3. The District Court erred in refusing to 
consider the constitutionally-related claims of 
"equal protection of the laws", "uniform operation 
of laws", and the "constitutional standard of 
reasonableness" in evaluating Plaintiff's claims 
of having to pay 100% of the 3500 South Street 
roadway improvements costs (approximately 
$400,000+), when the COUNTY did not require 
corresponding exactions from similarly-situated 
developments, in the same geographical area and 
having a similarly-situated traffic impact (as 
described in vehicles per day upon the roadway) . 
4. The District Court erred in failing to award 
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the Plaintiff compensation for the economic value 
of those COUNTY-required improvements singularly 
serving off-site areas to the west of the B.A.M. 
development (namely, upsizing of underground storm 
sewer line, relocation of power/telephone poles, 
and corrective measures for church exit driveway 
interfacing with roadway) not made necessary, per 
se, by Plaintiff's development but nevertheless 
required by the COUNTY as part of the 
comprehensive development. 
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The interpretation and application of provisions of the 
state and national constitutions as well as Utah statute by 
the trial court are matters of law. The trial court's 
conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for 
correctness. United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park 
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme Court 1993); 
Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 
1341 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). 
This standard of review has also been referred to as a 
"correction of error standard". Jacobsen Investment Company 
vs State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1992); Sanders vs Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1992). "Correction of error" means that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on 
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1994) ; Provo River Water Users7 Association vs 
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Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The 
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and. does not defer in 
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State 
vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) ; Howell 
vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1997 the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT proposed to 
develop a 15-acre parcel of previously-unimproved real 
estate located at approximately 7700 West 3500 South, within 
the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County and subject to 
and within the geopolitical jurisdiction (for development 
approval issues) of Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY. The proposed 
development the "Westridge Meadows" subdivision 
consisted of single-family residential building lots, each 
approximately 10,000+ square feet in size. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY personnel informed the Plaintiff that 
the COUNTY would then (in 1997) require, as a condition of 
development approval for the subdivision, the dedication and 
improvement of 3500 South Street actually a Utah public 
roadway within the jurisdiction of the Utah Department of 
Transportation [UDOT] to the 40-foot "half-width". 
The Plaintiff undertook actions to begin development 
approval and in September 1997 obtained from the COUNTY 
Planning Commission "preliminary and final development 
approval" of the proposed development. Sometime between 
October 1997 and December 1997 COUNTY personnel "lost" the 
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subdivision plat, forcing B.A.M. to prepare a second plat. 
Relying upon the commitments made within and pursuant 
to the "preliminary plat approval" granted by the COUNTY 
three months before (in September 1997), B.A.M. purchased 
the 14-acre parcel. The property description thereof 
extended "to the centerline of the roadway", although at the 
time 3500 South Street had a paved half-width (eastbound 
lane) of only approximately 17 feet of pavement. 
In January 1998 COUNTY personnel informed the Plaintiff 
that the COUNTY was, in essence, rescinding the previously 
granted "preliminary development approval" and would 
require, as a condition of development approval, dedication 
and improvement of a 53-foot half-width for 3500 South 
Street. 
The Plaintiff protested and appealed this requirement 
(i.e. the 53-foot dedication), first to the County Planning 
Commission and ultimately to the Salt Lake County Board of 
County Commissioners, which in July 1998 voted to refuse to 
even consider the B.A.M. appeal, thus implicitly upholding 
the Ordinance requirement for the 53-foot half-width 
dedication and improvement. This litigation as a straight-
forward, garden variety "inverse condemnation" case seeking 
reimbursement of the "unconstitutional takings" effected by 
the COUNTY followed.1 [In actuality, the litigation was 
^his case is NOT, as the COUNTY has claimed, an "appeal" from 
a "land-use decision", which characterization presents an 
inappropriate stereotype of what the case is actually about. 
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filed in August 1998 and was underway for an entire year 
while the proposed subdivision was being approved, which 
finally occurred in August 1999. Any claims made by the 
COUNTY that it was unaware of the claims being made against 
it in the litigation, that B.A.M. had struck some kind of 
deal to pursue only a certain amount or nature of claim, or 
that B.A.M. had agreed to install certain improvements, are 
disingenuous and misleading. B.A.M. was merely unwillingly 
agreeing to do what the COUNTY'S highway-abutting Ordinance 
already required B.A.M. to do. B.A.M. certainly could not 
request that the COUNTY not obey its own ordinance, nor 
could the COUNTY agree to ignore the mandatory provisions of 
its own ordinance. To imply as the COUNTY may hereafter 
claim that the COUNTY was not given an opportunity to 
administratively deal with B.A.M.'s claims is 
disingenuous: the COUNTY had an entire year while the 
litigation was pending to not require the excessive 
dedications, and so forth. And for over eight years after 
the development has been approved and the litigation was 
pending, the COUNTY could have proposed a settlement. The 
COUNTY fought the litigation and resisted every step of the 
way; the COUNTY has had more than ample opportunity to 
"settle" the case, on any and all issues.] 
The case was tried before Judge Timothy Hanson of the 
Third District Court. Judge Hanson ruled, on the basis of 
COUNTY arguments, that there was a "rational basis" for the 
COUNTY-required exactions, and disallowed the B.A.M. claims 
8 
for "just compensation". 
The original appeal was directed to the Utah Supreme 
Court, which "poured over" the appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. In February 2004 the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
its opinion. B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. vs Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710 (Utah App 2004) . All three Court 
of Appeals judges determined the Nollan-Dolan standard was 
applicable to this litigation, however a two-judge Court of 
Appeals plurality decided the case should be "remanded" back 
to the County government, for an administrative hearing and 
determination of Plaintiff's claims. Judge Orme dissented 
from that portion of the ruling. 
Both parties thereafter filed cross-petitions for 
certiorari review of the Court of Appeals decision. The 
COUNTY sought review on the Nollan-Dolan standard; the 
Plaintiff sought review of the "administrative remand" 
issues as decided by the two-judge Court of Appeals 
plurality. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari review 
on the three narrow issues it framed for the certiorari 
review. In January 2006 the Utah Supreme Court issued its 
written opinion [2006 UT 2, 128 P. 3d 1161 (Utah Supreme 
Court 2006)] in which the Supreme Court unanimously upheld 
the applicability of the Nollan-Dolan standard. The Supreme 
Court overruled the Court of Appeals on the "administrative 
remand" issue and affirmatively directed the case be sent 
back only to the District Court, for its determination of 
the case, using the Nollan-Dolan standard. 
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In October 2006 Judge Hanson of the District Court 
conducted a one-day "bench trial" hearing, in which the 
Court took additional evidence on the "rough 
proportionality" issue. 
In late-December 2006 the District Court issued a 
"Memorandum Decision" in which the District Court, without 
apparently attempting a scholarly analysis or at least 
visibly putting that effort onto the printed page of the 
Dolan "rough proportionality" standard applied to the facts 
or evidence adduced during the case, ruled in favor of the 
COUNTY. This appeal followed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has again "poured over" the 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for adjudication. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant's arguments are summarized as follows: 
1. An "impact" of 3.04% in increased traffic 
count (as measured in vehicle-trips-per day, of 
440 trips-per-day) is not "roughly proportional" 
to requiring the Developer-Plaintiff to dedicate 
real estate and effect improvements equivalent to 
100% of the cost thereof, regardless of how much 
real estate the Developer had initially and/or was 
actually taken. 
2. Any seeming correlation between the "impact" 
measured in vehicles on-the-road (i.e. "traffic 
count") and the percentage of the land-dedication 
is totally coincidental and represents a 
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misunderstanding on the part of both the COUNTY 
and the District Court as to the substantive 
requirements of Dolan. 
3. The District Court in ostensibly believing 
that all developments "fronting" on an existing 
public road must install improvements for that 
roadway erred in disregarding the Plaintiff's 
claim for the out-of-pocket expenses associated 
with the installation of those improvements, which 
are unconstitutionally "excessive" in light of the 
COUNTY-required barrier fence and the required 
"internal street" frontage servicing the 
northernmost row of building lots. 
4 . The District Court erred in failing to apply 
the Developer's "state law" claims which are 
essentially equivalent to the "rough 
proportionality" standard of Dolan. 
ARGUMENT 
In simplest terms, this case is quite straight-forward: 
1. Plaintiff B.A.M. sought COUNTY development 
approval for the development of a single-family 
residential development (ultimately 44 building 
lots), which generated approximately 440 vehicle 
trips-per-day in increased traffic count. 
2. The 15-acre area proposed for development by 
B.A.M. was immediately to the south of 3500 South 
Street (actually a UDOT-controlled state highway), 
in Salt Lake County. 
3. The paved portion of the "eastbound" lane of 
3500 South Street was approximately 17 feet in 
width across the almost 900-foot "frontage" of the 
B.A.M. development. 
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4. The pre-development "traffic count" of the 
3500 South Street roadway was approximately 12,000 
vehicles per day. 
5. The COUNTY required B.A.M. which owned the 
real estate "to the centerline of the roadway" 
to dedicate a 53-foot "half-width" across the 
entire frontage of its parcel, and to install 
curb, gutter, sidewalk and other improvements. 
6. The COUNTY also required B.A.M. to install the 
barrier fence across the entire "frontage" of the 
development, thus effectively denying access to 
3500 South Street for the northernmost "building 
lots", for which "internal" street frontage with 
improvements was additionally required. [The 
barrier fencing thus rendered the entirety of the 
3500 South Street improvements to be 
"unconstitutionally excessive", which is and has 
always been the Plaintiff's "core" claim under the 
Nollan-Dolan standard.] 
7. B.A.M. "lost" at least two "building lots", 
currently worth in excess of $100,000 each, by 
reason of the County's excessive real estate 
dedication requirements. 
8. The COUNTY also required B.A.M. to expend in 
excess of $200,000 in making roadway and other 
unrelated improvements (i.e. storm sewer line 
upsizing, power pole relocation, adjacent property 
driveway realignment) as part of the 3500 South 
Street improvements. 
9. Other nearby developments, including but 
limited to the nearby "Elusive Estates" 
subdivision, essentially creating an equivalent 
"traffic count" upon 3500 South Street, were not 
required by the COUNTY to make any dedications or 
improvements, notwithstanding the similar "impact" 
such other similarly-situated developments 
actually created. 
Reduced to a single rhetorical sentence, B.A.M.'s claim is 
simply framed: 
Why should B.A.M. but for only the unfortunate 
circumstance of geographical location of being 
located immediately adjacent to a public roadway 
[3500 South Street] which governmental authorities 
want improved to a traffic count" carrying-
capacity not needed until decades into the future 
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(i.e. calendar year 2020) be presently coerced 
to make "unconstitutionally excessive" dedications 
of real estate and incur excessive out-of-pocket 
expenses for roadway and unrelated improvements 
costing hundreds of thousands of dollars namely, 
to pay for 100% of the cost of the roadway when 
the traffic count "impact" actually created by the 
B.A.M. development was less but 3.04% of the total 
vehicles on the roadway so impacted? 
The rhetorical question is simply answered: 
A 3.04% "impact" is not "roughly proportional" 
(i.e "related in nature and extent") to a 100% of 
the cost the Developer [B.A.M.] was expected to 
shoulder, which costs at least 96.96% thereof 
should be borne by the public-at-large! 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED PROPERLY APPLY 
AND FOLLOW THE NOLLAN-DOLAN STANDARD 
AS DIRECTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
A 
THE NOLLAN-DOLAN STANDARD OF "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" 
As early as 1980 the United States Supreme Court had 
written: 
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may 
not transform private property into public 
property without compensation, even for the 
limited duration of the deposit in court. This is 
the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That 
Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary 
use of governmental power. 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Incorporated vs Beckwith, 449 US 
155 at 164, 101 SCt 446 at 452 (1980). Emphasis added. 
In the "landmark decision" of Nollan vs California 
Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 107 SCt 3141 (1987), the 
United States Supreme Court addressed the "constitutional" 
issue involved in an "in-kind exaction" such as here at 
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hand. The landowner owned a beachfront parcel upon which was 
built a small, dilapidated bungalow the landowner desired to 
demolish and replace with a larger residential structure. He 
applied for permission to erect the larger structure, but 
was denied development approval unless the propertyowner 
granted to the public a public access easement across the 
oceanside end of his parcel, upon which the public could 
traverse the privately-owned in getting from one "public 
beach" to another. Following state court decisions favorable 
to the California Coastal Commission, the propertyowner 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court which found the 
requirement to dedicate the "public access" easement to 
violate the United States Constitution. Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority, held against the Coastal 
Commission's requirement (for the public easement) and 
wrote: 
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the 
condition and the original purpose of the building 
restriction converts that purpose to something 
other than it was. The purpose then becomes, quite 
simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some 
governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of 
"legitimate state interests" in the takings and 
land use context, this is not one of them. In 
short, unless the permit condition serves the same 
governmental purpose as the development ban, the 
building restriction is not a valid restriction of 
land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion. 
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. An "out-and-out plan of 
extortion" are pretty strong words for the United States 
Supreme Court to characterize local government actions. As 
the "mathematical" applications described herein [in either 
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the "cost of existing facilities" or the "impact" (defined 
in terms of daily traffic-count) context] clearly show, the 
"de minimis", almost non-existent "reasonable relationship" 
or "nexus" between the "permit condition" (i.e. the required 
exaction = dedication and improvement) and the impact 
created by the new development is such so as to render the 
exaction constitutionally impermissible. [The COUNTY7 s 
essentially-simultaneous granting of development approval 
for the Elusive Estates subdivision which actually MORE 
traffic count to the 3500 South Street roadway, but which 
was not required to undertake any exactions effectively 
precludes the COUNTY from claiming, disingenuously so, that 
the required exactions (roadway dedication and improvement, 
by B.A.M.) was in lieu of a "development ban".] 
In Nollan the Supreme Court continued: 
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to 
be more than a pleading requirement, and 
compliance with it more than an exercise in 
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, 
our cases describe the condition for abridgement 
of property rights through the police power as a 
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State 
interest. We are inclined to be particularly 
careful about the objective where the actual 
conveyance of property is made a condition to the 
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that 
context there is a heightened risk that the 
purpose is avoidance of the compensation 
requirement, rather than the stated police power 
objective. 
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. 
In Nollan the Court rejected the idea that the 
governmental permission to develop was a "governmental 
benefit" conferred upon the propertyowner. The Court wrote: 
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But the right to build on one's own property 
even though its exercise can be subjected to 
legitimate permitting requirements cannot be 
remotely described as a "governmental benefit". 
And thus the announcement that the application for 
(or granting of) the permit will entail the 
yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded 
as establishing a voluntary exchange. 
Footnote at 107 SCt at 3147. Emphasis added. 
In examining the California Coastal Commission's 
"comprehensive program" which is, arguably, the functional 
equivalent to the COUNTY'S assertedly "uniform and 
comprehensive plan" of requiring "highway-abutting" parcels 
to effect the dedication and improvements the United 
States Supreme Court in Nollan concluded: 
. . . The Commission may well be right that it is 
a good idea, but that does not establish that the 
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be 
compelled do contribute to its realization. 
Rather, California is free to advance its 
"comprehensive program," if it wishes, by using 
its power of eminent domain for this "public 
purpose" see U.S. Const. Amdt. 5; but if it wants 
an easement across Nollans property, it must pay 
for it. 
107 SCt at 3151. Emphasis added. 
Nollan would not have been materially different in its 
result had the California Legislature, by statute, declared 
that all owners of "ocean-abutting" parcels needing building 
permits are required to dedicate a "public easement" across 
their parcels at water's edge. Nollan was decided and 
constitutes "the law of the land" on the basis of 
substantive, "constitutional" principles, not on some 
procedural technicality (i.e. how the "taking" decision was 
made and/or by whom). 
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In Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309 
(1994), the United States Supreme Court was presented with 
the opportunity to revisit Nollan and to articulate "what is 
the required degree of connection between the exactions 
imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the 
proposed development." 114 SCt at 2312. In holding against 
the municipality, the Court wrote: 
One of the principal purposes of the Takings 
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some 
people to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a 
whole." (quoting Armstrong vs United States) 
Under the well-settled doctrine of 
"unconstitutional conditions", the government may 
not require a person to give up a constitutional 
right here the right to receive just 
compensation when property is taken for public 
use in exchange for a discretionary benefit 
conferred by the government where the property has 
little or no relationship to the benefit. 
114 SCt at 2316-2317. Emphasis added. 
In attempting to define the "degree of the exactions 
demanded by the city's permit conditions bears to the 
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development" [114 
SCt at 2318] , the Court was faced with several legal 
standards. In describing the various standards and in 
adopting a "federal standard" (for Just Compensation Clause) 
purposes), the Dolan Court wrote: 
A number of state courts have taken an 
intermediate position, requiring the municipality 
to show a "reasonable relationship" between the 
required dedication and the impact of the proposed 
development. Typical is the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska's opinion in Simpson v. North Platte, 206 
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Neb. 240, 245, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1980), where 
that court stated: 
"The distinction, therefore, which must 
be made between an appropriate exercise 
of the police power and an improper 
exercise of eminent domain is whether the 
requirement has some reasonable 
relationship or nexus to the use to which 
the property is being made or is merely 
being used as an excuse for taking 
property simply because at that 
particular moment the landowner is asking 
the city for some license or permit," 
Thus, the court held a city may not require a 
property owner to dedicate property for some 
future public use as a condition for obtaining a 
building permit when such future use is not 
"occasioned by the construction sought to be 
permitted." Id., at 248, 292 N.W.2d, at 302. 
Some form of the reasonable relationship test 
has been adopted in many other jurisdictions. 
[Citations to cases omitted.] Despite any semantic 
differences, general agreement exists among the 
courts "that the dedication should have some 
reasonable relationship to the needs created by 
the [development]." [Citation to authorities 
omitted. ] 
We think the "reasonable relationship" test 
adopted by a majority of the states courts is 
closer to the federal constitutional norm than 
either of those previously discussed. But we do 
not adopt it as such, partly because the term 
"reasonable relationship" seems confusingly 
similar to the term "rational basis" which 
describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
We think a term such as "rough 
proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to 
be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No 
precise mathematical calculation is required, but 
the city must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the impact of 
the proposed development. 
114 SCt at 2319-2320. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and 
other authorities cited in original Supreme Court text 
have been omitted.] 
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Thus, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a 
legal standard which is "part law" and "part mathematics". 
That mathematics is directly implicated in the application 
of the Dolan standard is clearly indicated by: 
1. The Court's selection of the phrase "rough 
proportionality" itself: a "proportionality" 
connotes a mathematical comparison and/or 
description of two numerically-measurable 
quantities or concepts. 
2. The United States Supreme Court affirmatively 
utilized the "mathematical" term itself, when the 
Court stated "no precise mathematical calculation 
is required, but the city must make some 
individualized determination". Emphasis added. 
3 . The Court issued the Dolan decision for the 
expressed purpose of resolving "what is the 
required degree of connection between the 
exactions imposed by the city and the projected 
impacts of the proposed development." 114 SCt at 
2312. Emphasis added. 
Although the term "rough proportionality" may connote 
specific legal and/or mathematical (i.e. relationship) 
concepts, the above-quoted language indicates that the 
United States Supreme Court understands the "rough 
proportionality" term to be such that 
" . . . the required dedication is related both in 
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development." 
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Id. Emphasis added. Thus, rather than focusing upon the 
simplistic, two-word "roughly proportional" term itself, the 
correct analysis should be upon the additional text 
contained within the Dolan opinion. 
The "related" requirement (definition) of the "required 
dedication" is thus separated into its two constituent 
subparts: 
a. "related in nature" 
AND 
b. "related in extent" 
"Related in nature" has a certain QUALITATIVE connotation: 
a like-kind, associative character, a similanty-in-kind, 
apples-to-apples comparison suggested meaning. The phrase 
"related in extent" has a QUANTITATIVE connotation: a 
measuring, comparative, numerical counting meaning. 
The word "both" in the original text confirms that EACH 
of the TWO "related" requirements must be met. Thus, when 
applied to a specific "required dedication" such as 
B.A.M.'s the dedication must be "related in nature" 
(qualitatively similar: like-kind, associative, similarity-
in-kind) AND "related in extent" (the dedication may not be 
quantitatively "excessive"). Similarly, there must be a 
correlation between the "required dedication" itself and the 
actual "impact" of the new development. 
With respect to the "rough proportionality" required to 
be derived and shown (in a burden-of-proof context) by the 
government, the Dolan court wrote: 
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No precise mathematical calculation is 
required, but the city must make some effort to 
quantify its findings in support of the dedication 
for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the 
conclusory statement that it could offset some of 
the traffic demand generated. . . . The city's 
goal of reducing flooding hazards and traffic 
congestion, and providing for public greenways, 
are laudable, but there are outer limits to how 
this may be done. "A strong public desire to 
improve the public condition [will not] warrant 
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change." 
[114 SCt at 2322. Emphasis added. Bracketed material in 
original text.] 
B 
ANY MATHEMATICAL CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE 
OF INCREASED "TRAFFIC COUNT" AND THE RELATIVE 
PERCENTAGE OF THE DEVELOPER'S REAL ESTATE 
SO "TAKEN" BY REASON OF THE REQUIRED DEDICATION 
IS STRICTLY COINCIDENTAL AND IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE DOLAN STANDARD OF "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY" 
It is readily seen that the "purpose" of the COUNTY'S 
Ordinance (mandating the "dedication/improvement") of the 
highway, but only by those highway-abutting parcels, is 
simply, 
" . . . . the obtaining of an easement to serve 
some governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation. 
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. The Ordinance is that 
transparent. Coupled with the acknowledged practice that 
adjacent parcels don't have to effect any dedication the 
"purpose" is simply to obtain increased roadway 
improvements, but without paying for those improvements! 
That's not a valid purpose, and Nollan and Dolan make that 
point clear. 
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Following remand from the Utah Supreme Court, the 
District Court held on 17 October 2006 a one-day bench 
trial, in which the Court received additional evidence and 
considered new arguments. Following those arguments, the 
Court took the matter under advisement. 
In late-December 2006 literally two days before the 
effective date of his previously-announced retirement 
Judge Timothy Hansen issued his "Memorandum Decision", in 
which he found for the Defendant COUNTY on all issues and 
claims. Except for some otherwise-conclusory text, Judge 
Hansen in his "Memorandum Decision" made no specific 
findings, but rather directed counsel for the COUNTY to 
prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together 
with a final judgment ruling in favor of the Defendant. 
The Defendant's counsel prepared the formal findings, 
conclusions and judgment, promptly lodged the same with the 
District Court, which almost immediately signed those 
Findings, Conclusion and judgment. This appeal followed. 
Assuming as must be the case that the COUNTY-prepared 
"findings" and "conclusions" represent what the COUNTY 
believes to be the most favorable evidence (i.e. the facts) 
and the particular legal result (i.e. the law) arising from 
the remand trial, and given the fact that the District Court 
promptly "signed" those findings and conclusions, both the 
COUNTY and the District Court will be "stuck with" those 
findings and conclusions. 
As shown herein, the "findings and conclusions" 
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evidence a complete lack of understanding as to how the 
Nollan-Dolan standard of "rough proportionality" is to be 
conceptually understood and is to be applied to the instant 
situation. 
As is shown herein, any apparent2 mathematical 
correlation between the 3.04% additional vehicles on the 
road with the 1.89% or 2.2% percentage of the Developer's 
real estate area taken for right-of-way dedication is 
strictly coincidental and has no legal or factual 
significance. The operative "findings" and "conclusions" 
as prepared by the COUNTY and as accepted by the District 
Court are thus: 
Findings: 
18. As a result of her traffic analysis, Ms. 
Pullos determined that BAM's proposed subdivision 
development was likely to generate an additional 
440 vehicle trips per day on 3500 South street. 
This calculation assumed ten (10) vehicle trips 
per day per additional housing unit. 
20. Ms. Pullos determined that the additional 440 
vehicle trips per day likely to be generated by 
BAM's proposed development represented an 
increased traffic volume of 3.04% on 3500 South 
street within the traffic link. 
21. In conducting her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos 
determined that the impact of the 3.04% increased 
traffic volume likely to be created by BAM's 
proposed development was roughly proportionate to 
the additional land required for highway 
2In making this assertion, the Plaintiff B.A.M. should not be 
misconstrued or misunderstood to believe or state that the 3.04% 
percentage is "roughly proportional" in nature and in scope to the 
demand and needs created by the B.A.M. development. There simply is 
no "rough proportionality", plain and simple. 
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dedication by BAM, as a percentage of the entire 
parcel owned by BAM. [Emphasis added. This 
"finding" by the District Court is flawed. In the 
original (April 2001) bench trial, Ms Pullos gave 
no testimony as concerning any percentage of 
B.A.M.'s parcel. Ostensibly, this result was 
because the COUNTY defended on the basis that 
Dolan didn't apply to the case at bar. Whether 
there was testimony or not, the written finding, 
as so adopted by the District Court in 2006, 
nevertheless evidences the flawed mathematical and 
legal methodology the COUNTY presented to the 
District Court, which accepted that flawed 
methodology.] 
24. Therefore, the additional 13-feet of highway 
dedication area required to be dedicated by BAM 
represented 1.89% of the entire BAM parcel 
(11,696.23/619,781.54 = .01887). 
26. Therefore, the dedication resulted in a loss 
to BAM of 2.22% of its available building lots 
(1/45 = .02222). [Emphasis added.] 
Conclusions of Law: 
4. The additional 440 vehicle trips per day 
likely to be generated by BAM's proposed 
development represented an increased traffic 
volume on 3500 South street within the traffic 
link, or "impact", of 3.04%. 
5. Whether the exaction at issue in this case is 
considered as (a) a percentage of area of the 
entire parcel owned by BAM comprising the 
Westridge subdivision (i.e. 1.89%), or (b) the 
resulting percentage loss to BAM of its available 
building lots (i.e. 2.22%), it [the exaction] was 
"roughly proportionate" to the increased traffic 
volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed 
development. [Emphasis added. Bracket text added 
for clarity] 
[Bracketed text of explanation and comment added 
Appellant's counsel, to specifically explain or rebut 
stated "finding".] 
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The Court of Appeals' attention is drawn to Paragraph 
5 of the Conclusions, which essentially sums up the entirety 
of the COUNTY'S approach and thus illuminates in the 
opinion of the undersigned, as B.A.M.'s counsel the 
COUNTY'S and the District Court's erroneous application of 
the Nollan-Dolan standard to the case. The District Court 
concluded: 
[w]hether the exaction at issue in this case is 
considered as (a) a percentage of area of the 
entire parcel owned by BAM comprising the 
Westridge subdivision (i.e. 1.89%), or (b) the 
resulting percentage loss to BAM of its available 
building lots (i.e. 2.22%), it [the exaction] was 
"roughly proportionate" to the increased traffic 
volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed 
development. 
Emphasis added. Bracketed words added for clarity. 
Any mathematical correlation between the 3.04% of 
increased traffic count and the 1.89% or 2.22% numbers 
both of which are intuitively going to be pretty close to 
each other, given the way subdivisions are platted and 
developed, for "lot yield" and so forth is purely 
coincidental, as any number of derived "hypothetical 
examples" will readily show. 
What the COUNTY and the District Court have each 
overlooked and/or misapplied is B.A.M.'s claim is that 
B.A.M. had to pay 100% of the cost of hundreds of thousands 
of dollars of "excessive" roadway improvements, of a roadway 
for which the carrying capacity was increased from 12,000 
per day to as much as 37,000+ vehicles per day: a tripling 
of carrying capacity, albeit for that "half-width" and for 
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that short roadway segment of "frontage". So even though the 
County's introductory narrative on pages 1 and 2 of the 
Order ["judgment"] correctly recite the legal posture of the 
case [i.e. "that the County must make an individualized 
determination of exactions imposed on a land developer 
wherein the exactions must be 'roughly proportionate' to the 
likely impact of the proposed development"], the County (and 
the District Court) totally "miss it" on the mathematics, as 
such is actually applied to and through "the law", and vice 
versa. 
If B.A.M. added concededly so the 3.04% to the 
"daily traffic count" (440 vehicles per day, to the pre-
existing 12,000 or so vehicles per day) , B.A.M. should have 
increased the need the paved surface of the roadway only the 
corresponding 3.04%. [Mathematically, such would be about 
500 square feet of dedication and paving, but not more.] 
B.A.M. should not have been required to dedicate and pave an 
additional 11,000+ square feet (and that's calculated from 
the so-called "40-foot line"). Thus, the COUNTY'S legal 
analysis and mathematics are both out-of-whack and flawed. 
Taking the County-required dedication, and only the 
paving thereof, alone, B.A.M. has been required to more than 
double the paved portion roadway. Had the roadway been 
improved merely to the so-called 33-foot line, the increase 
in pavement alone would be in the 3 or 4 additional feet, 
times the 900 linear feet of "frontage", equals 
approximately 3 000 square feet. The increase in paving alone 
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going from 33 feet to 53 feet adds an additional 18,000 
square feet, on top of that starting amount: facially 
obvious to be more than a doubling, whether B.A.M. [through 
its manager, Mr McCleary] agreed or not.3 Any assumed 
"agreement" on the part of B.A.M. is merely what the 
highway-abutting Ordinance simply required in the first 
place. The COUNTY, as promulgator and beneficiary of that 
Ordinance, should be estopped from asserting otherwise. As 
Nollan accurately observed, the right to develop private 
property is not a governmentally conferred benefit which can 
be deemed to be consideration for the relationship, mutually 
bargained for. The Ordinance always required the dedication, 
so any claimed "agreement" on B.A.M.'s part is immaterial as 
far as "takings" law is concerned. The lawsuit was filed 
even before the "taking" was actually effected. [The COUNTY 
knew all along it was being sued and could have "exacted" a 
lesser quantity of real estate, etc.; indeed, the COUNTY 
expressly rejected such a proposal: B.A.M. proposed to leave 
the right-of-way undeveloped until UDOT actually would take 
and develop the same.] 
3Mr McCleary in the April 2001 original trial testified 
that he was essentially coerced into agreeing to practically 
anything: the economic realities of the government-citizen 
relationship are such a fact rarely recognized by 
government the government has considerably more resources 
and "hold-out capacity" than any citizen, particularly one 
seeking governmentally-granted development approval wherein 
the government literally has the citizen-propertyowner "over 
the barrel" of economics. 
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What B.A.M. "lost" (real estate, lot "yield", square 
footage added to the existing paving, and so forth) is but 
the "tip of the iceberg" injury: the "exaction" is defined 
in terms of what B.A.M. was actually required to do the 
direct, out-of-pocket expense [the real estate "dedication" 
AND the related improvements] to improve the public roadway, 
over and above BAM's "roughly proportional" impact thereon 
(as arguably expressed in terms of "traffic count" and so 
forth) . 
Neglecting the "traffic count" issues and focusing 
strictly upon the roadway itself, pre-development the 3500 
South Street was approximately 17 feet of paved surface 
(half-width); post-development the paved surface alone was 
in the 33 feet range. Thus, BAM essentially doubled the 
paved surface alone! For which BAM's traffic count increase 
was a mere 3.04% increase. When the adjacent improvements 
are added, the "excessiveness" of the exaction becomes 
astronomical, even under the simplest of mathematical 
comparisons or derivations. 
Any number of "hypothetical examples" might be derived 
to illuminate not only the flawed methodology, but also 
effectively show that there is NO MATHEMATICAL CORRELATION 
between the "traffic count" and the "real estate area" 
available for the County-coerced "dedication", and that any 
seeming "rough proportionality" between the 2.2% (real 
estate "taken") and the 3.04% (increased traffic count) is 
strictly coincidental. [If the COUNTY had utilized ALL of 
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the real estate actually "taken", the 2.2% would have been 
actually much higher not that such proves anything, other 
than the numbers can be "tweaked" for about anything. There 
is no correlation or relationship, for "law" purposes.] 
Numerous even an infinite number, theoretically of 
"hypothetical examples" could be developed and described to 
illustrate the various "excessive" results, as per the 
COUNTY'S methodology. While in mathematics proper, no 
particular theorem or postulate itself is satisfactorily 
"proved by example" (or even proved by a series of examples 
so proved, or even if no "examples" can be found to disprove 
the assumed theorem). Math and logic don't work that way; 
proof is proof and if proof is required, then the theorem 
should be subject to a definitive proof. 
We are not here dealing with issues which necessarily 
lend themselves to the rigors or precision of a mathematical 
"proof" of a precise mathematical theorem or postulate. We 
are dealing here with fundamental "constitutional" issues 
between a citizen and the government. 
There is plain and simple no mathematical 
correlation between the numbers which the COUNTY and the 
District Court have asserted and concluded! Consequently, 
and for related reasons, there is as a matter of law no 
"rough proportionality" between the required dedication and 
the impact ostensibly justifying that dedication, at least 
as shown by the County's mathematics and legal analysis of 
Dolan. 
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On the other hand, a single "example" can certainly 
disprove the rightness or logical correctness of any 
hypothesis, legal or mathematical. For example, assume for 
sake of illustration and argument the correctness of the 
COUNTY'S position and the District Court's "conclusion" (to 
the effect that the developer, creating a 3.04% "impact" can 
be coerced to lose up to 2.2% of his entire real estate, and 
that such is "roughly proportional"). The error in this 
illogical and unrelated result is readily seen by the 
following "hypothetical examples"4: 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #1. Assume that instead of 
the Developer's parcel be hundreds of feet in its 
north-south dimension, is rather only 
approximately 248 feet in its north-south 
dimension and is capable (as required by the 
government) to install the "internal street" (60-
foot right-of-way) on the south side of a single 
row of residences, ten (10) in number and which 
are arbitrarily platted to be 145 feet "deep". The 
highway-abutting Ordinance requires the dedication 
to the 53-foot right-of-way line, because that's 
what the COUNTY requires and that's what UDOT and 
Wasatch Front would ultimately like to see. The 10 
building lots will generate in the aggregate 
approximately 100 vehicle-trips-per day, which 
equals to only 0.80% (eight-tenths of one percent) 
of the increased traffic count on the 3500 South 
Street roadway, but the developer has been 
required to dedicate 53 feet times 900 feet for 
the roadway, which equals 21.3% of the developer's 
real estate. [A "dedication" from the 17-foot line 
to the 53-foot line would be 36 feet, or 14.5% of 
the developer's total real estate.] CONCLUSION: 
The 0.80% (eight-tenths of one percent) "impact" 
4The COUNTY may raise objection to these "hypothetical" 
examples. These "examples" illuminating the illogical 
conclusions actually reached by the District Court are no more 
objectionable than the COUNTY'S post-hearing mathematical 
calculation and derivation of the 1.89% and 2.2% numbers 
suggested to the District Court to support the "rough 
proportionality" argument. 
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bears absolutely no corresponding (i.e. "rough 
proportionality" = "related both in nature and 
extent") correlation to the area to be taken. 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #2. Assume that the parcel 
for the proposed development is located so that 
its lay-out is generally along a north-south axis: 
the parcel is 900 feet in a north south dimension, 
and merely 170 feet in the east west dimension. 
Further assume that ten single-family residences 
could be developed thereon. The ten residences 
generate that same increased traffic count 
"impact" of 100 vehicle-trips-per-day ( = 0.80%, 
as measured against the pre-existing 12,000+ 
vehicles already on the 3500 South Street 
roadway). IF the COUNTY "took" (required the 
dedication of) area to the 53-foot right-of-way 
line, such would be 53/900ths (which approximates 
5.8% of the developer's total area). 
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #1 and HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #2, 
examined together, evidence that the methodology adopted by 
the COUNTY simply doesn't work: the required percentage of 
land dedication must correlate to the actual "traffic 
impact" (as measured in vehicle-trips-per-day); the 
developer's "loss" should be function of the geographical 
directional axis of the lay-out of his parcel. Any and all 
apparent mathematical equivalency is purely coincidental. 
Note that in each of the two foregoing "hypothetical 
examples" only the right-of-way dedications (ala real 
estate) are examined; the "hypothetical" do not address the 
theoretically "constant" costs for the installed roadway 
improvements. [In HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #2, however, those 
improvements across a 170-foot east-west dimensioned 
"frontage" would be significantly less than those required 
for a 900-foot frontage (in B.A.M.'s situation, in excess of 
$200,000.00).] 
31 
The Court of Appeals should not narrowly read Dolan 
(which specifically dealt with a "dedication" only) and 
ignore the "twin sister" (undersigned's terminology) issue 
of the required improvements costs, which are just as 
constitutionally significant and integral to B .A.M. ' s claims 
herein as the dedication of the real estate for the 3500 
South Street roadway. The COUNTY Ordinance required BOTH 
dedication and improvement; the B.A.M. pleadings identified 
both components parts (dedication and improvements) and the 
case was tried on that basis. The COUNTY should not be heard 
to state that the "improvements costs" are not part of 
B.A.M.'s "inverse condemnation" claims for reimbursement for 
the unconstitutionally-excessive governmental requirements . 
B.A.M. suggests that the following mathematical 
approaches more correctly satisfy the correct analytical 
methodology to evaluate and apply the Dolan standard of 
"related both in nature and extent" to the impact of the new 
development: 
SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY #1. Because the pre-
existing roadway is approximately 17 feet 
(approximately 204 inches) in paved width across 
the B.A.M. frontage, and because the B.A.M. 
development will generate a new traffic increase 
of only 3.04%, B.A.M. should pave an additional 
3.04% to the existing quantity of asphalt. B.A.M. 
would pave 3.04% of 204 inches ( = approximately 
6 inches of additional "width"), for the length of 
the 900-foot "frontage" of its development. That's 
about 450 square feet [900 feet x 0.5 feet (i.e. 
6 inches) = approximately 450 feet], which 
albeit small--is a definable quantity. This 
approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
pronouncement pertaining to the seven requirements 
of the "constitutional standard of 
reasonableness", as identified in its decision of 
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Banberry Development Corporation vs South Jordan 
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah Supreme Court 1981), 
specifically, criteria #1: "the cost of existing 
facilities") . This approach is similar to that 
applied in the case of Lafferty vs Payson City, 
642 P. 2d 376 (Utah Supreme Court 1982) [City-
required electrical connection fees remanded for 
proper application of Banberry criteria]. 
The foregoing approach arguably takes into account the 
"cost of existing facilities" and attributes a value thereto 
of 100%, without regard of any time-price comparison, and so 
forth. It is simplistic in its approach and is, as Dolan 
requires, "related both in nature and extent" to the impact 
actually created by the B.A.M. development. 
SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY #2. Similar to SUGGESTED 
METHODOLOGY #1, above, but B.A.M. cannot be made 
to contribute more than the existing "cost of 
existing facilities". Thus, if the 17-foot (i.e. 
2 04 inch) paved roadway is worth $xxx.xx, and the 
B.A.M. development will add 3.04% to the aggregate 
traffic load of that paved portion, then B.A.M. 
ought to pay an amount equal to 3.04% of the 
monetary "cost of existing facilities". At the 
trial, the COUNTY produced no evidence as to what 
that "cost" of the existing 17 feet of paved 
roadway might be; B.A.M. personnel testified that 
the present "value" of the paved roadway might be 
in the range of $1.25 per square foot for the 
asphalt itself and $1.25 per square foot for the 
preparation ( = $2.50 per square foot, total). 
[Note that no value is attributed to the 
underlying real estate, of the 17-foot paved area, 
as B.A.M. owned that 17 feet, to the so-called 
"centerline of the roadway". B.A.M. ought not to 
have to pay for a proportionate cost of a portion 
of roadway which is theoretically not even owned 
by the government, even though B.A.M. would not be 
entitled to collect "just compensation" for that 
17 feet, as per Western Kane County Special 
Service District No. 1 vs Jackson Cattle Company, 
744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah 1987) [County government must 
condemn and pay for portions of desired roadway 
not previously paved] discussed herein. Thus, 
mathematically, B.A.M. owes and should be expected 
to "pay" in a "dollar/monetary" analysis of the 
situation for the paving only of only 
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approximately 450 square feet time $2.50 per 
square foot = $1125.00 not the $400,000+ B.A.M. 
was actually required to "pay" through the in-kind 
exactions and dedication. 
In either of these two "methodologies", the B.A.M. arguments 
of "denial of equal protection" and of the Banberry 
"constitutional standard of reasonableness" are temporarily 
overlooked, for the simplicity of the argument and result. 
If the COUNTY'S approach were "fair" in its scope and 
application, similarly-situated and nearby developments such 
as "Elusive Estates", having the same (or perhaps even 
greater) traffic count "impact" would not be granted a "free 
pass" and required to pay nothing. IF the County were to 
"equalize" the entire across-the-board problem for all 
subdivisions through the assessment and collection of a 
"roads impact fee" which the County has NOT adopted the 
COUNTY is statutorily precluded from utilizing "state 
roadways" as a basis for any "roadway impact fee", as 
prohibited by Section 11-36-102(14) (b) , Utah Code. 
B.A.M. identifies perhaps even a third "suggested 
methodology": 
SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY #3 [illustrates why the 
COUNTY's/District Court's methodologies are 
mathematically wrong] : The B.A.M. development adds 
the 3.04% to the traffic count "impact". If the 
value of the entire 17-foot "half-width" paved 
portion of the roadway across the entire 900-foot 
frontage is $2.50 per square foot, times 15,300 
square feet (17 feet times 900 feet = 15,300 
square feet) square feet, equals 30,600 + 7650 = 
$38,250, times the 3.04% = approximately 
$1,125.00, which is the expected result, as per 
METHODOLOGY #2 (the "dollar value" approach), 
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above.5 This is a far cry from the $400,000+ which 
B.A.M. was actually required to expend. 
C 
THE COUNTY'S RECENTLY-ADOPTED, CLAIMED COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE DOLAN STANDARD IS DISINGENUOUS AND 
BELIES THE COUNTY'S HISTORICALLY-ADVANCED POSITION 
Until the Utah Supreme Court announced its decision in 
this case (on certiorari review) , the COUNTY vigorously and 
consistently asserted that the Dolan "rough-proportionality" 
standard was inapplicable, particularly to a legislatively-
prescribed exaction for which no "adjudicative decision" was 
actually made, to effect the "taking". The COUNTY'S 
assertions that Dolan's "individualized determination" 
element is inapplicable to the situation-at-hand is not 
merely intellectual, but lies at the core of this "appeal", 
for very pragmatic reasons. At trial, and before the Court 
of Appeals, the COUNTY argued that neither Nollan nor Dolan 
was applicable. An example of this the COUNTY'S legal 
historic position is found in its BRIEF for certiorari 
review, in which the COUNTY asserted in the "headnote 
(title) " to Point I of its arguments contained in its REPLY 
BRIEF in the earlier "certiorari" proceeding, that there was 
"no unconstitutional taking", ostensibly because the "rough 
proportionality" test of Dolan did not apply. [Excerpts from 
the COUNTY'S certiorari" briefs are attached as ATTACHMENT 
5This mathematical derivation is essentially equivalent to the 
"monetary" calculations of SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY #2, albeit 
utilizing differently-described quantities and factors: the result 
for B.A.M. is nevertheless expectedly the same. 
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#3 and ATTACHMENT #4 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.] The COUNTY 
thus misread the Dolan decision. The Utah Supreme Court 
determined otherwise: the "constitutional" principle of 
"rough proportionality" is constitutionally applicable to 
all of these "takings" situations. 
The "constitutional essence" of this case is literally 
"boiled down" to the COUNTY'S written observations, although 
the COUNTY'S conclusions totally miss the mark, as contained 
in pages 5-6 of the COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF in its "writ of 
certiorari" claims before the Utah Supreme Court, thus: 
The highway-dedication ordinance at issue here, 
involves a generally applicable legislative 
assessment (or "exaction"), not one which is 
imposed or which can be imposed individually. 
As with any developer who chooses to develop a 
parcel which abuts a highway, BAM was required 
here to comply with a uniform legislative scheme 
which expects all similarly situated developers 
[footnote omitted] to dedicate highway rights-of-
way consistent with current uniform road-width 
standards. Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to 
ensuring that community development occurs in 
accordance with sensible long-range transportation 
planning. Otherwise, under BAM's view of the law, 
road-width requirements for new construction along 
major traffic corridors would vary radically from 
parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage, 
and other impact characteristics of each 
individual parcel. In practical effect, an 
"individualized" impact analysis would require a 
different road-width dedication for every single 
parcel located along the side of a highway. Rather 
than having roadways with even and consistent 
widths, road boundaries would be required to jut 
in and out in front of each abutting parcel, as 
dictated by an "individualized determination" of 
each parcels traffic impact. The absurd practical 
consequences of this application of Dolan "rough 
proportionality" in such a case are obvious. 
Pages 5-6 of COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF. Italicized text in 
original. Citation to footnote omitted. Previously, the 
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COUNTY in its Opening Brief for certiorari [p. 28] 
characterized the "practical consequence" of following Dolan 
as "absurd" and "nightmarish". 
Obviously, what the COUNTY ignores in all of this is 
the constitutional mandate: that government can obtain the 
right-of-way roadway width of any dimension government 
wants. However, the government must pay for it. 
What is truly "absurd" and "nightmarish" is the 
thought, as the COUNTY seemingly advocates, that government-
--whether by "legislative" or by "administrative" fiat or 
decision, it really doesn't matter can disregard the clear 
constitutional mandate of the Just Compensation Clause. 
As the "mathematical" applications described herein [in 
either the "cost of existing facilities" or the "impact" 
(defined in terms of daily traffic-count) context] clearly 
show, the "de minimis", almost non-existent "reasonable 
relationship" or "nexus" between the "permit condition" 
(i.e. the required exaction = dedication and improvement) 
and the impact created by the new development is such so as 
to render the exaction constitutionally impermissible. 
Indeed, the COUNTY'S long-standing, historic approach--
-even in the face of B.A.M.'s pre-litigation claims that the 
Dolan decision prohibited the County's actions was to 
require the coerced dedications and improvements, without 
regard to any "individualized determination" . Indeed, as the 
COUNTY'S written arguments (i.e. "different road-width 
dedication for every single parcel located along the side of 
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a highway" and "road boundaries would be required to jut in 
and out in front of each abutting parcel, as dictated by an 
"individualized determination" of each parcel's traffic 
impact") to the Utah Supreme Court clearly evidence, the 
COUNTY'S actual approach has become, quite literally, the 
"out-and-out plan of extortion" anticipated in Nollan. 
Indeed, the COUNTY'S approach is, quite literally, the 
result that 
a heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of 
the compensation requirement, rather than the 
stated police power objective. 
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. 
In light of the previous legal assertions made by the 
COUNTY, the COUNTY should not be heard otherwise [i.e. "that 
we (the COUNTY) complied with Dolan" when in fact the COUNTY 
simply didn't (comply with Dolan)]. 
In the instant setting, the "heightened risk" that the 
true "purpose" behind the COUNTY'S arbitrarily-applied 
"highway- abutting" dedication requirement (but non-existent 
"building ban") is readily and unavoidably apparent and 
transparent: the "avoidance of the compensation 
requirement", as the foregoing text identifies. The COUNTY'S 
claim that the "stated police power objective" (of acquiring 
right-of-way AND privately-installed public improvements) is 
disingenuous, as well as being unconstitutionally-applied. 
This is exactly the setting which is "a heightened risk" 
that the development exaction (i.e. the roadway dedication 
and improvements) is for the "avoidance of the compensation 
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requirement" . Such is transparently clear from even the most 
casual reading of the COUNTY' s "highway-abutting Ordinance" . 
The COUNTY'S thinly-veiled attempt to disguise the 
unconstitutional result must be judicially found to be 
unconstitutional. As the above-referenced quotation from the 
COUNTY'S own brief to the Utah Supreme Court shows, the 
roadway dedication requirement has had as its fundamental 
purpose the "avoidance of the compensation requirement" [of 
the Just Compensation Clause], rather than a legitimate 
stated police power objective. 
Similarly, the COUNTY'S present position is contrary to 
the evidence adduced at the original trial (April 2001), as 
well as the October 2006 "remand hearing", wherein County 
Traffic Engineer Andrea Pullos didn't really conduct the 
"individualized determination" to confirm the "rough 
proportionality" ("related both in nature and extent to the 
impact") which Dolan requires; rather, Ms Pullos simply 
contacted UDOT and Wasatch Front Regional Council (a quasi-
governmental planning agency) and asked those other 
governmental agencies, in essence, "What do you want the 
3500 South Street roadway, in year 2020, to be?". Any 
testimony of Ms Pullos to the contrary (ala October 2006) is 
the result of a Johnny-come-lately, back-peddling approach 
adopted only after the Utah Supreme Court unanimously 
announced the applicability of the Dolan standard. 
The "picture" the COUNTY thus "paints" has the 
following obvious feature, which the COUNTY seemingly 
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ignores: ONLY "highway-abutting" parcels are singled out for 
the roadway dedication requirement. The development of other 
similarly-situated parcels described not in terms of 
"highway-abutting", but rather generally in terms of 
creating the same impact (i.e. vehicular traffic added to 
the roadway infrastructure) are exempt from any 
"dedication" and "improvement installation" requirements. 
The COUNTY is correct that under the "individualized 
determination" standard of Dolan, the improved roadway 
widths would "jut in and out" along the frontage of the 
abutting parcel. What the COUNTY in its self-serving 
"constitutional myopia" is refusing to recognize, but which 
the Court will readily acknowledge, is that there is another 
potential result: namely, that the Government can have 
roadways of whatever width it chooses, but the Government 
must pay "just compensation" for the property interests it 
"takes". Understood in its essential substance and 
procedure, the "highway-abutting" Ordinance has in fact 
and in law as its transparent purpose, "the avoidance of 
the Just Compensation requirement". The Ordinance, rather 
than being legitimized, is thus condemned, as the Nollan 
Court described: 
the legislative scheme becomes an out-and-out plan 
of extortion. 
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. 
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c 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER 
AND APPLY THE "UTAH STATE LAW" STANDARDS 
APPLICABLE TO THE DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 
The "reasonable relationship" standard previously 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in cases such as Call vs 
City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P. 2d 217 (Utah Supreme Court 
1979) , on rehearing 614 P.2d 1259 (1980) , reversed on other 
grounds 727 P.2d 180 (1986), and Banberry Development 
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1981) in which the "reasonable relationship" 
standard was identified and adopted are essentially one-
and-the-same standard. [In fact, the United States Supreme 
Court in Dolan and in Nolan identified Utah as having 
adopted the "reasonable relationship" standard prevalent 
among the state courts which have decided the issue.] It is 
perhaps unfortunate that the United States Supreme Court 
developed a new phrase "rough proportionality" to describe 
judicial standards which had previously been part of the 
Utah legal landscape. Notwithstanding, the newly-coined 
"rough proportionality" standard (of Dolan) is the exact 
equivalent of the "reasonable relationship" standard of Call 
and of Banberry under state law.] 
In 1981 almost two decades ago the Utah Supreme 
Court was presented with the case of Banberry Development 
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1981) . In Banberry a real estate developer challenged 
South Jordan City's required parks and culinary water 
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connection "impact fees" and "exactions". In resolving the 
legal issue and going to great lengths to establish landmark 
precedence certainly for Utah the Utah Supreme Court 
wrote: 
The Home Builders case established the 
principle upon which the reasonableness of the 
water connection fee in this case should be 
judged. The "fair contribution" of the connecting 
party should not exceed "the expense thereof met 
by others." Or, as the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held in a subsequent case, the rules governing the 
allocation of improvement costs between city and 
developer would ideally have been such as to 
insure, to the greatest extent practicable, that 
the cost of extending a municipal water facility 
would fall equitably upon those who are similarly 
situated and in a just proportion to benefits 
conferred. They should be sufficiently flexible 
to permit consideration to be given to the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case. 
Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E. 
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 (1972). 
Therefore, where the fee charged a new subdivision 
or a new property hookup exceeds the direct costs 
incident thereto (as a means of sharing the costs 
of common facilities), the excess must survive 
measure against the standard that the total costs 
"fall equitably upon those who are similarly 
situated and in a just proportion to benefits 
conferred." Stated otherwise, to comply with the 
standard of reasonableness, a municipal fee 
related to services like water and sewer must not 
require newly developed properties to bear more 
than their equitable share of the capital costs in 
relation to benefits conferred. 
To determine the equitable share of the 
capital costs to be borne by newly developed 
properties, a municipality should determine the 
relative burdens previously borne and yet to be 
borne by those properties in comparison with the 
other properties in the municipality as a whole; 
the fee in question should not exceed the amount 
sufficient to equalize the relative burdens of 
newly developed and other properties. 
631 P. 2d at 904. Emphasis added. The Utah Supreme Court 
continued, by identifying seven criteria to be evaluated to 
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determine the "relative burden already borne and yet to be 
borne" by the newly-developed properties. 
The Utah Supreme Court, quoting approvingly from a New 
Jersey court opinion, continued: 
The rule we lay down must be given a pragmatic 
application. Complete equality of treatment may 
sometimes be impossible, especially where a 
municipality has followed no set pattern with 
respect to past extensions. Nor should a 
municipality be denied the right to modify an 
established pattern where altered circumstances 
reasonably so dictate. Equality of treatment may 
upon occasion be forced to give way before some 
supervening public interest. But insofar as such 
equality can reasonably be achieved this must be 
done, 
631 P. 2d at 904. Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Utah 
Supreme Court intends that everyone that is, those 
creating the "impact" should pay, "equally" if possible 
but "almost equally as possible", in any regard. 
The Utah Supreme Court continued: 
Reasonableness obviously holds the 
municipality to a higher standard of rationality 
than the requirement that its actions not be 
arbitrary or capricious. 
As with water connection fees, the amount of 
such exactions or fees should be such that the 
burden of providing these municipal services 
"falls equitably upon those who are similarly 
situated and in a just proportion to benefits 
conferred." Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of 
E. Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 
(1971). The measurement of "benefits conferred" 
may have a more significant impact on the 
reasonableness of park fees than on water 
connection fees. The central facilities that 
support water and sewer service would generally 
confer the same benefits in every part of the 
municipality, but the benefits conferred by 
recreational, flood control, or other dispersed 
resources may be measurably different in different 
parts of the municipality. Park improvement fees 
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should therefore be fixed so as to be equitable in 
light of the relative benefits conferred on, as 
well as the relative burdens previously borne and 
yet to be borne by, the newly developed properties 
in comparison with the other properties in the 
municipality as a whole. The fees in question 
should not exceed the amount sufficient to 
equalize the relative benefits and burdens of 
newly developed and other properties. 
631 P. 2d at 903. Emphasis added. Public roadways, like 
"parks", are "dispersed resources". In fact, roadways are 
arguably the most "dispersed" of all governmentally-owned 
resources. 
In Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P. 2d 217 
(Utah Supreme Court 1979), on rehearing 614 P.2d 1259 
(1980), reversed on other grounds 727 P.2d 180 (1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court defined and established the Utah standard 
as to the constitutional validity of "impact fees" (and, 
implicitly, "in-kind exactions"), to be one of "reasonable 
relationship" (that is, there must be a reasonable 
relationship between the needs created by the development 
and the impact fee (or in-kind exaction) required of the 
developer. 
The COUNTY is similarly prohibited from utilizing the 
"in-kind exaction" to cure pre-existing deficiencies. County 
Traffic Engineer did testify the roadway improvements 
required of B.A.M. would raise the "service level" of the 
pre-existing 3500 South roadway. That's an obvious "no 
brainer". [Raising the "service level" of the 3500 South 
roadway from its present (1997) "service level D 
(approaching gridlock)" to "service level B (almost free-
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flowing)" is, in essence, "curing the pre-existing 
deficiency" nevertheless unconstitutionally imposed upon 
a single developer, the Plaintiff B.A.M.] 
That government should pay for the additional property 
so acquired (from the existing 1997 paved roadway 
extending 17 feet to the lip of the asphalt paving) is 
mandated by a long line of Utah judicial decisions. See, for 
example, Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 
vs Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P. 2d 13 76 (Utah Supreme Court 
1987) [holding that the government must condemn and pay for 
those portions of the intended roadway which are outside of 
that portion of the roadway which might be claimed to be 
public from previous usage]. 
In the instant situation, as suggested by the COUNTY 
and so found/concluded by the District Court, there simply 
is neither the "in nature" nor the "in extent" relationship 
(i.e. combined "rough proportionality") to the required 
dedication. The derived percentage of 2.2% of the 
development's available real estate has no correlation 
related "in nature" and related "in extent" to the 
required dedication (i.e. impact, of 3.04% of additional 
cars on-the-road). 
Moreso than merely adopting the coined-phrase "rough 
proportionality", the United States Supreme Court in Dolan 
went to great lengths to describe the foundational 
"constitutional" significance of the Just Compensation 
Clause: that the government is required to pay for the 
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private property being "taken". 
Moreso than adhering only to the simplistic phrase 
"roughly proportional" (and all of its mathematical and/or 
conceptual connotations), the extensive narrative text 
quotations from Dolan shown above unqualifiedly evidence the 
Supreme Court's directive: that there is simply more than 
mathematical calculation here at issue. Propertyowners whose 
property is "taken" by governments are entitled to Just 
Compensation Clause remedies. Plain and simple. The 
COUNTY'S and the District Court's "mathematics" and 
"law" are simply out-of-whack. 
In an "apples-to-apples" comparison not the "apples-
to-oranges" non-correlation the County advanced and the 
District Court accepted a 3.04% "impact" (as measured by 
increased "traffic count" is simply NOT "roughly 
proportional" to a 100% of the cost! 
The COUNTY'S requirement that the Plaintiff install 
improvements which are in excess of the needed improvements 
projected for more than twenty years to year 2020 into 
the future is certainly constitutionally suspect: certainly 
"excessive" given the 3.04% increase in traffic count. 
What Nollan and Dolan expect is adherence to 
constitutional principle: that government may not condition 
development approval upon the uncompensated "taking" of 
private property for public use, unless the "taking" 
correlates to the impact actually created! 
Nolan is NOT merely about some beachfront property and 
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the beautiful views which might be enjoyed by members of the 
public as they saunter across a former privately-owned 
beach! Dolan is NOT merely about a jogging path adjacent to 
a creek, which sometimes overflowed during the rainy season. 
Nollan and Dolan are about constitutional principles which 
have direct application, factually and legally, to the 
issues at bar. Nollan would not have a different analysis or 
result had the California requirement been phrased "all 
ocean-abutting properties shall dedicate an easement" . Dolan 
would not have had a different analysis or result that the 
City's requirement been phrased "all Fanno Creek-abutting 
properties shall dedicate an easement . . .". 
In essence, literally, this case and the COUNTY'S 
methodology illuminates a situation which the United States 
Supreme Court has characterized as the 
"heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of 
the compensation requirement [of the Just 
Compensation Clause], rather than the stated 
police power objective. 
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. Bracketed material added 
for clarity. 
CONCLUSION 
The COUNTY'S requirement as to the dedication and full 
improvement of the 53-foot roadway "half-width" are 
extraordinarily excessive, under terms of both federal 
[Nollan and Dolan] and state [Banberry] "constitutional" 
law. 
The COUNTY's late-adopted "individualized 
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determination" of the impact created by the "Westridge 
Meadows" development and its "reasonable relationship" 
("rough proportionality") to those needs fails miserably. 
The COUNTY failed in its burden to establish that the 
required dedications are reasonably "related in both in 
nature and extent of the proposed development." 
The COUNTY has unconstitutionally required a single 
property-owner to bear substantial expenses, which should be 
borne by the public-at-large. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the 
District Court [incorrectly adjudicating the matter on these 
"matters of law" issues] and direct the District Court to 
enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
County: 
1. Declaring the required dedications and 
exactions to be unconstitutionally "excessive" and 
to be in violation of constitutional provisions, 
as herein described and shown; 
2. Awarding the Plaintiff the reasonable value of 
the dedications and improvements, including the 
"severance damages" against the remainder parcel 
(calculated on the basis of the retail selling 
price of the two building lots "lost" by reason of 
the excessive dedication), together with the 
improvement costs of the 3500 South Street roadway 
improvements, "unconstitutionally excessive" in 
light of the barrier fencing and the requirement 
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that the developer install the "internal street" 
for the northernmost row of building lots; 
3. Awarding such other relief as is appropriate. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of June, 2007. 
rney -£Or Appellant 
.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C. 
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June, 2 0 07. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, CASE NO. 980908157 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the : 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
This matter was last before the Court on October 17, -2006. Counsel 
and the parties were present. 
The matter before the Court was based upon a remand from the Supreme 
Court to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. 
The Supreme Court, on December 13, 2005, issued its Opinion relating 
to the plaintiff's appeal of this Court's ruling on plaintiff's claims 
at the conclusion of the previous trial when this Court found the issues 
in this case in favor of the defendant Salt Lake County, and against the 
plaintiff B.A.M. Development. 
The Supreme Court, in the aforementioned Opinion, determined that 
this Court erred when it refused to apply the so-called "rough 
proportionality" test in evaluating the plaintiff's claims. The remand 
required this Court to review the evidence at the'original trial, take 
ATTACHMENT 1 
B.A.M. V. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
any new evidence that was appropriate, and then reevaluate the 
plaintiff's claims, applying the "rough proportionality" test. 
Following the taking of new evidence on October 17, 2006, this Court 
reviewed the evidence from the original trial and prior hearings, 
together with the evidence received on October 17, 2006. The Court also 
reviewed the relevant legal briefs filed by the parties during this 
proceeding, both before and after the Supreme Court's decision, and has 
evaluated the plaintiff's claim using the "rough proportionality" 
standard as required by the Supreme Court, and has also noted the recent 
statutory enactments referred to by the Supreme Court in its Opinion. 
Having used those standards, the Court finds that the defendant's 
exactments required of the plaintiff for approval of its development are 
roughly proportional to the impact of the plaintiff's proposed 
development. Further, the Court finds that there is an essential link 
between the governmental interests and each exaction. The Court finds 
the defendant's evidence and legal arguments persuasive, and that they 
form a basis for the factual findings referenced above. 
The Court will enter an appropriate Order to be prepared by counsel 
for the defendant, together with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav;, 
determining that the plaintiff's claims are dismissed, no cause of 
action, on any of the claims set forth in plaintiff's Complaint and that 
the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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Counsel for the defendant, after preparing the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal, should submit the same to the 
undersigned in care of Kathy Westwood, Judge Kate Toomey's lead clerk, 
who will ensure that the documents are made available to the undersigned 
for review and signature. The submissionyof the final Orders should be 
all in accordance with the Rules of Civ^l Procedure. 
Dated t h i s _day of December , / 2 0 0 6 . 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 \ 2007 
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— H p n i Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic of the State of Utah, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW and ORDER ON REMAND 
Civil No. 980908157 CD 
Judge TIMOTHY HANSON 
[On remand from Utah Court of Appeals No. 
20010840-CA and 
Utah Supreme Court No. 20040365] 
The above captioned civil action came on regularly for a bench trial on October 17, 2006 on 
an order of remand by the Utah Supreme Court (see decision and remand order, Utah Supreme Court 
No. 20040365, at 2006 UT 2, 128 P.3d 1161). 
The issues before the district court on remand are (1) whether a highway right-of-way 
dedication required by defendant Salt Lake County ["County"] as a condition of approving the 
subdivision development application of plaintiff B.A.M. Development, LLC ["BAM"] was "roughly 
proportionate" to the impact likely to be created by BAM's proposed development, and (2) whether 
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the County made an "individualized determination" of such rough proportionality with respect to 
BAM's proposed development. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm 'n, 107 S.Ct 3141 (1987) 
and Dolan v. City ofTigard, 114 S.Ct 2309 (1994) for the proposition that the County must make 
an individualized determination of exactions imposed on a land developer wherein the exactions 
must be "roughly proportionate" to the likely impact of the proposed development. Dolan, 114 S.Ct 
at 2319. On appeal, neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Utah Supreme Court addressed 
BAM's appeal of this court's dismissal of BAM's "equal protection,'' "uniform operation of laws" 
and "equitable estoppel"causes of action. See, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
entered July 30, 2001 ( R. 266-273). 
At the remand trial, Plaintiff was represented by Stephen G. Homer, Esq., and Defendant 
was represented by Donald H. Hansen, Deputy District Attorney. The parties waived opening 
argument, presented their respective evidence and closing arguments. The Court then took this 
matter under advisement, reviewed the trial exhibits and testimony received at the remand trial on 
October 17, 2006, reviewed the exhibits and transcribed witness testimony from the original trial of 
on April 23 and 24, 2001, and examined memoranda submitted by the parties and the legal 
authorities cited therein. 
The Court, being fully advised, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 30, 1997, Salt Lake County [hereinafter, "the County"] received the 
application and proposed plat of plaintiff B.A.M. Development [ "BAM"] for its 
proposed Westridge Meadows subdivision ["Westridge"] to be developed at 
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approximately 7700 West 3500 South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's 
proposed plat included a 40-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street running 
along the north boundary of BAM's property. 
2. On August 26, 1997, BAM's subdivision proposal was approved by Salt Lake 
County engineering and development staff, subject to compliance with County road 
standards, including a 40-foot right-of-way ["ROW"] highway dedication of land 
abutting 3500 South street. 
3. The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County 
Ordinance §15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27-801. 
Under certain circumstances, the County ordinance required dedication of highway 
ROW space by developers of property abutting a major or secondary highway in 
accordance with the County's Transportation Master Plan. 
4. The County relied upon traffic projections and recommendations of the Wasatch 
Front Regional Council and the Utah Department of Transportation ["UDOT"] in 
formulating its Transportation Master Plan. The road-width recommendations of the 
Wasatch Front Regional Council were based upon a long-range transportation study 
projecting highway capacity needs in Salt Lake County to the year 2020. 
5. On or about June 10,1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed by the 
Wasatch Front Regional Council and UDOT that the currently required highway 
ROW for 3500 South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width (i.e., 53-foot 
half-width). The County then incorporated the revised ROW requirement into its 
Transportation Master Plan. 
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On or about June 15, 1998, Andrea Pullos, the County's transportation engineer, 
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt Lake 
County roadway standards, including the 53-foot half-width ROW dedication of 
3500 South street. 
On June 23, 1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval to 
BAM's amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street. 
On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a Notice of Appeal of the Planning Commission's 
dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40-feet. BAM's 
appeal did not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval imposed by the 
County. 
On July 15, 1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal. 
On June 23, 1999, the County Planning Commission approved BAM's amended 
subdivision plat, which had been modified by BAM to include the required 53-foot 
highway dedication.. 
On August 18, 1999, the Board of County Commissioners granted final approval of 
the Westridge subdivision plat with the 53-foot highway dedication. 
On August 27, 1999, the Westridge subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter constructed the subdivision. 
The increase of the highway ROW dedication required of BAM from 40-feet to 53-
feet resulted in a loss to BAM of one building lot in the Westridge subdivision. 
In or around April, 1998, Andrea Pullos, the County transportation engineer, 
conducted an analysis of historical and projected traffic volumes on 3500 South street 
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in the "traffic link" between 7200 West and 8400 West streets. 
15. BAM's proposed development was located within this traffic link at approximately 
7700 West. 
16. Transportation engineers typically study traffic patterns on a given street by isolating 
a "traffic link" on the street between major intersecting cross streets. 
17. Ms. Pullos' traffic analysis relied, in part, upon historical traffic data compiled by 
UDOT reflecting increasing traffic volume on 3500 South street within the 7200 
West-8400 West link. 
18. As a result of her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos determined that BAM's proposed 
subdivision development was likely to generate an additional 440 vehicle trips per 
day on 3500 South street. This calculation assumed ten (10) vehicle trips per day per 
additional housing unit. 
19. The assumption often (10) vehicle trips per day per household is a generally 
recognized standard in the field of transportation engineering. 
20. Ms. Pullos determined that the additional 440 vehicle trips per day likely to be 
generated by BAM's proposed development represented an increased traffic volume 
of 3.04% on 3500 South street within the traffic link. 
21. In conducting her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos determined that the impact of the 3.04% 
increased traffic volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed development was 
roughly proportionate to the additional land required for highway dedication by 
BAM, as a percentage of the entire parcel owned by BAM. 
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22. The area of entire parcel owned by BAM comprising the Westridge subdivision 
consisted of 619,781.54 square feet. 
23. The additional 13-feet of highway dedication area required to be dedicated by BAM 
was 11,696.23 square feet (i.e., 13 feet multiplied by 899.71 lineal feet, the length of 
the frontage of BAM's parcel abutting 3500 South street). 
24. Therefore, the additional dedication required of BAM represented 1.89% of the entire 
BAM parcel (11,696.23/619,781.54 = .01887). 
25. The additional 13-feet of highway dedication area required to be dedicated by BAM 
resulted in the loss of one building lot, from 45 lots to 44 lots. 
26. Therefore, the dedication resulted in a loss to BAM of 2.22% of its available building 
lots (1/45 =.02222). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In this action, BAM challenges the required 53-foot highway dedication as well as 
various other conditions of the subdivision approval imposed by the County, or 
"exactions," such as installation of curb and gutter, paving, storm and sewer lines, 
and other items. However, since the only issue appealed by BAM to the County 
Board of Commissioners was the County's requirement of a 53-foot highway 
dedication, rather than a 40-foot dedication, that is the only issue ripe for adjudication 
before this Court, because the County never made a final decision on any other issue 
now raised in this action by BAM Development since such issues were not part of 
BAM's administrative appeal. See, Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n 
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 (1985). 
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2. The County's highway right-of-way dedication requirement, as applied in this case, 
is a development "exaction" as that term is used in the Nollan and Dolan decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court and elsewhere in American "takings" law. 
3. Under the Nollan and Dolan decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other 
controlling "takings" precedents, a finding of "rough proportionality" between a 
development exaction and the impact likely to be created by a proposed development 
does not require "mathematical precision." The proportionality need only be 
approximate, or "rough." 
4. The additional 440 vehicle trips per day likely to be generated by BAM's proposed 
development represented an increased traffic volume on 3500 South street within the 
traffic link, or "impact," of 3.04%. 
5. Whether the exaction at issue in this case is considered as (a) a percentage of the area 
of the entire parcel owned by BAM comprising the Westridge subdivision {i.e., 
1.89%), or (b) the resulting percentage loss to BAM of its available building lots 
(i.e., 2.22%), it was "roughly proportionate" to the impact in increased traffic 
volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed development. 
6. Defendant Salt Lake County, through its transportation engineer, in or around April 
1998, made an "individualized determination" of "rough proportionality" between 
the required development exaction and the likely impact of BAM's proposed 
development. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds in favor of the defendant Salt Lake County and 
therefore 
ORDERS that no cause of action is found against Defendant Salt Lake County on any claim 
set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint, and said Complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
Judgment is hereby entered accordingly. 
Dated this day of_ njua^ 2007. 
7 
Utah 'phird District Court 
By: 
M-->r. .v 
• ( / • • • • ' • . , . . . • * . 
7IMOTHV R\^4NS0N : 
District C^rt^xlge ~^y' 
Approved as to form: 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
- PAGE 8 OF 8 • 
ATTACHMENT 2 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
B.A.IVI. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Respondent and Cross-Petitioner, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the State of Utah, 
Petitioner and Cross-Respondent. 
OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND CROSS-RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
David E. Yocom 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Donald H. Hansen 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, No. S-3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
Attorney for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent 
Stephen G. Homer, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan UT 84088 
Attorney for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner 
ATTACHMFNT 3 
Supreme Court No. 20040365-SC 
(20010840CA) 
Priority 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT .... 
SCOPE OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 3 
2. Statement of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 
1. No unconstitutional "talcing" of private property without just compensation 
occurred in this case under the United States or Utah constitutions under the 
Nollan and Dolan cases where the County's highway dedication ordinance 
required dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive 
"legislative" transportation scheme, rather than an ad hoc, site-specific 
"adjudicative"decision S 
(A) Utah's Statutory Scheme for County Regulation of Subdivision 
Development 14 
(B) The County Subdivision and Highway Dedication Ordinance, as a 
Legislative Measure of General Application, Is not Subject to a Dolan 
Analysis 18 
(C) Separating Nollan from Dolan: An "Essential Nexus" does not 
Necessarily Require "Rough Proportionality" 34 
2. The court of appeals correctly held that the district court's review of land use 
decisions is generally limited to the administrative record pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann., Sec. 17-27-1001 35 
3. Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits filing an action in the district court 
reuardless of the state of the administrative record 38 
ATTACHMENT 3 
(a) the County lacked a ^legitimate governmental interest" in transportation corridor 
planning15, or (b) that the highway dedication ordinance is not "reasonably related" to such 
an interest. See, Smith Investment ai 95^ i\2d 252. As a facial takings challenger, BAM 
must carry the burden of showing that the ordinance "does not advance legitimate state 
interests." See. Smith. Investment,95$ \> .Aial in. 1 8; see also, Dolan v. CitvofTigarcLsi(f)r<i. 
512 U.S. at 385, 1 MS.Ct. at 2316 (1994). But this proposition BAM has not even attempted 
to establish. Accordingly, BAM did not and cannot meet its burden under a facial challenge 
to the County's highway-dedication ordinance. 
All four cases cited by BAM arc readily distinguishable from the instant case in thai 
they concern exactions mandated in response to individual impact characteristics which were 
unique to the developments in each case. In this case, however, the County highway-
dedication requirement operates independently of any unique characteristics or proposed uses 
of specific parcels to which it applies. As with any land subdivider who chooses to develo;.) 
a parcel which abuts a highway, BAM was required here simply to comply with a uniform 
legislative scheme which expects similarly situated land subdivided0 to dedicate highway 
rights-of-way consistent with current uniform road-width standards. 
Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to ensuring that community development 
,DIn fact, BAM concedes that the County has a valid interest in this respect. 
Appellant's Brief (Court of Appeals), p. o. 
'""Similarly situated" developers are those who, like BAM, develop property 
which abuts a major or secondary highway. See County Code of Ordinances, Sec. 
15.28.010 
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occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation planning. Otherwise, under 
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-widih requirements for new construction along 
major traffic corridors would vary radically from parccl-to-parcel, depending on the size. 
usage, and other impact characteristics ofeach individual parcel. In practical effect, the BAM 
doctrine would require a different, road-width dedication for every single parcel located along 
the side of a highway. Rather than having roadway segments with even and consistent 
widths, road edges and shoulders would be required to jut in and out in front of each abutting 
parcel, as dictated by an "individualized determination" of each parcel's impact. Th/absurd 
anci/TnghtmarishY)ractical consequences of this notion are obvious. 
However, while BAM correctly perceives the County's highway-dedication ordinance 
as a generalized ^location-based" exaction, as opposed to an individualized "impact-based" 
exaction like those in the cases upon winch BAM relies, it still insists that the County's 
ordinance must pass muster under the "individualized'1 Dolan approach. 
This distinction is critical to determining the proper analysis for constitutional review 
In the recent California Supreme Court case ol'San Re/no Hotel, L.P. v. City and County oj 
San Francisco,41 P.3d 87, 27 Cal.4lh 043, 1 17 Cal. Rptr.2d (Cal. 2002), this very distinction 
was discussed at length, and specifically m die context o\ the DuLin "proporuonaiitN" 
analysis. There, the plaintiff-hotel owner sought a city permit to convert a long-term rental 
housing facility into a short-term tourist rental facility. The city imposed a "housing 
replacement^ exaction which required plaintiff-- and all other residential hotel conversion 
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occurred in this case under the United States or Utah constitutions under the 
Nollan and Dolan cases where the County's highway dedication ordinance 
required dedication of property pursuant to a uniform and comprehensive 
"legislative" transportation scheme, rather than an ad hoc, site-specific 
uadjudicativc"decision 1 
2. The court of appeals correctly held that the district court's review of land use 
decisions is generally - but not in this case - limited to the administrative 
record pursuant to Utah Code Ann. , Sec. 17-27-100 1 
9 
3. Section 63-90a-4 of the Utah Code permits filing an action in the district court 
regardless of the state of the administrative record 1 1 
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this s t r ingent const i tu t ional d e m a n d when the dedicat ion requirement was only 40-feet , instead 
of 53-feei . H A M f lif. in e\pl.iiii IMW or why the additioi 1; ll 13 It *et c )f reqi in e< :1 r i j >ht-of-way 
dedication elevated this case to constitutional dimensions. Again, BAM focuses erroneously 
upon the degree (i.e., quantity) of the dedication, rather than its underlying source and character 
(i.e., legislative). 
The highway-dedication nrdm.m.. ,ii issue here, in\ wives a generally applicable 
legislative assessment (or "exaction"), not one which is imposed - or which can be imposed ~ 
individually. As with any developer who chooses to develop a parcel which abuts a highway, 
BAM was required here to comply with a iiniform legislative scheme which expects all 
similarly situated developers7 to dedicate highway rights-of-way consistent witl 1 ci irrent uniform 
road-wid th s t andards . Such a uniforni s cheme is fundanlenial to ensur ing that c o m m u n i t y 
deve lopment occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportat ion plainling. Otherwise , 
under B A M ' s view of the law, road-wid th requirements for new const ruc t ion a long major 
traffic corr idors would vary radical ly from parcel- to parcel, depend ing on the size, usage , and 
open ing br ief (q. v., at pp . 20 - 32) inasmuch as the latter cases u i nvo lv [ed ] imposi t ion of a 
general scheme of fees or regulations on development that are similar to general 
applications of local governmental police power," and not the "forced physical 
occupation of private property as a condition of development.1' Amicus Brief, pp. 8 - 9. 
In this regard, the amicus is correct. However, like BAM, the amicus does not cite any 
cases arising from highway right-of-way dedication statutes or ordinances, which further 
suggests that this issue - presented in this particular context - is a matter of first 
impression. 
7
"Similarly situated" developers are tluov. v, nw, i,Lc 15AM, develop property which 
abuts a major or secondary highway. Sec Co>wih'» '• ><v ,it ()rdinanees. Sec. 1 5.28.010 
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other impact characteristics of each individual parcel. In practical effect, an "individualized" 
impact analysis would require a different road-width dedication for every single parcel located 
along the side of a highway. Rather than having roadways with even and consistent widths. 
road boundaries would be required tojut in and out in front of each abutting parcel, as dictated 
by an "individualized determination" of each parcel's traffic impact. Th/absurd practical 
consequences of this application of Dolan "rough proportionality" in such a case a?e obvious. 
The exaction in this case then, is not an "ad hoc" discretionary assessment imposed on 
an individualized basis at the whim of some bureaucrat, or based on unique impact factors 
attributable exclusively to BAM's particular development. Rather, as the trial court concluded, 
the County highway-dedication ordinance 
"imposes the requirement of dedication on a broad class of property owners who 
choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway [and] the 
assessment of how much property had to dedicated was not individualized, but 
rather was made pursuant to the generally applicable County Transportation 
Master Plan and applied across the board to all owners whose property abutted 
3500 South." 
Memorandum Decision, p. 3 | R. 249]. As such, it should be accorded deferential scrutiny on 
review and upheld so long as it "advances a legitimate governmental interests." 
The County acknowledges that the Nollan "essential nexus" test is a valid requirement 
for constitutional analysis of a development exaction8. While the Court of Appeals' dissenting 
opinion found that the County's highway dedication ordinance passed the "essential nexus" 
sWhile the Nollan court devised the phrase "essential nexus" to distinguish its 
takings analysis from the "rational relationship"test evolved in its line of equal protection 
decisions, the phrases are functionally indistinguishable. 
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